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As discussed throughout this volume, most standards-development organizations
(SDOs) have adopted policies requiring that participants either disclose and/or license
patents that are essential to the implementation of the SDO’s standards.2 Licenses of
these standards-essential patents (SEPs) must generally be royalty-free or royaltybearing on terms that are fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND). Conversely,
patents that are not essential to such standards need not be licensed on reasonable
terms, and in theory may be withheld entirely from the market. Accordingly, a key
element of SDO disclosure and licensing polices is how patents (or patent claims) are
classified as “essential” to a standard, and what essentiality entails in practice. This
chapter addresses the interpretation of the term “essential” within SDO patent policies,
focusing both on policy language and variants, as well as regulatory and judicial rulings
that have considered this question.
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A.

Origins of the Essentiality Requirement

This section traces the emergence and growth of essentiality requirements for patents
covering elements of technical standards. It first describes the evolution of essentiality
requirements in the patent policies of the American National Standards Institute (ANSI),
the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) and the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), three large and globally influential
organizations that have devoted significant attention to their patent policies. It then
addresses the parallel evolution of essentiality requirements in standards-based patent
pools, an evolution that clearly influenced what was happening within SDO patent policy
committees.
1.

SDO Policies
a)

ANSI

The earliest SDO patent policies did not include express requirements relating to the
essentiality of patents. As discussed in Chapter 9, the American Standards Association’s
(ASA) 1959 policy, generally considered to be the first SDO FRAND licensing policy,3
required that “[s]tandards should not include items whose production is covered by
patents unless the patent holder agrees to and does make available to any interested
and qualified party a license on reasonable terms…”4 Thus, the ASA policy applied to
patents covering the production of standardized items, though the term “covering” was
not elaborated in any detail.
ASA became the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1969. In policies
adopted from 1969 through 1977, ANSI retained ASA’s “covering” language, requiring
that if a standards-developer held a patent “covering any invention the use of which
would be required for compliance with the proposed [standard]”, the patent must be
licensed to applicants desiring to implement the standard.5 The use of “covering” was
discontinued in ANSI’s 1983 policy in lieu of a more detailed description of “any invention
the use of which would be required for compliance with the proposed [standard].” This
formulation continued through multiple revisions of ANSI’s policy through 2006.6
It was not until IEEE introduced the idea of “essential” patent claims in its controversial
2006-07 policy7 that ANSI followed suit. Thus, in January 2007 ANSI introduced the
concept of “essential” patent claims to its policy, which provides that:
There is no objection in principle to drafting an American National
Standard (ANS) in terms that include the use of an essential patent claim
(one whose use would be required for compliance with that standard) if it
is considered that technical reasons justify this approach.
Likewise, Section 3.1.1 of ANSI’s 2007 policy first required licensing of “essential patent
claims” with or without compensation and otherwise on “reasonable terms and

3

See Chapter 9.
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5
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6
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7
See Part A.1.c below.
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Essentiality
conditions that are demonstrably free of any unfair discrimination.”8 But by 2007, ANSI
was a relative latecomer to the definition of essentiality. As discussed below, ETSI had
already implemented this requirement a decade and a half earlier.
b)

ETSI

As discussed in Chapter 9, the major European national telecommunications operators
began to cooperate in the early 1980s to develop the emerging GSM “2G” cellular
wireless communications protocol intended to replace existing analog networks. In 1985,
the German, French and Italian telecom agencies entered into a technical cooperation
agreement (the DCR Agreement), which was joined by the UK one year later.9 The DCR
Agreement established the ground rules for technical cooperation among the four
European agencies, requiring, among other things, that if any of their suppliers held a
patent “essential” to any element of the GSM standard, then the supplier must grant a
“non exclusive free of charge operating license” to any European firm wishing to produce
or sell GSM-compliant equipment.10 The DCR Agreement goes on to define “essential”
patents as:
patents from which the standard is directly derived but also as the patents
which could be considered as absolutely necessary for the realization of
the standard.11
This appears to be the first formal essentiality requirement associated with standardsrelated patents. Though the DCR Agreement was never adopted by an SDO, and merely
represented the agreement of four potential users of standardized products, 12 the
princple of essentiality that it reflects was highly influential to later groups.
ETSI, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute, was formed in 1988 at the
urging of the European Commission in order to facilitate and accelerate the development
of European telecommunications standards. 13 Given the Commission’s heavy
involvement in telecommunications deregulation in Europe, it played an active role in
defining ETSI’s formative policies. As described in Chapter 9, there was significant
debate over ETSI’s first patent policy. An interim policy was not adopted until 1993, five
years after the organization was formed, but it met with so much resistance (largely from
U.S. technology vendors), that it was withdrawn. A revised interim policy was finally
adopted in November 1994.
Despite the controversy over many provisions of ETSI’s 1993 interim policy, its proposed
definition of essentiality met little opposition. The 1993 ETSI definition, which is more
nuanced than the DCR Agreement’s “absolutely necessary” formulation, provides that:
"Essential" as applied to IPR means that it is not possible on technical but
not commercial grounds, taking into account normal technical practice
and the state of the art generally available at the time of standardisation,
8

ANSI 2007.
Agreement on co-operation in the field of digital cellular radiocommunications, signed in Nice, France, June
20, 1985, extended to the UK on July 2, 1986 (“DCR Agreement”).
10
DCR Agreement 1985, Annex C, ¶ c.
11
Id.
12
At this time, GSM was being developed within CEPT, the European Conference of Postal and
Telecommunications Administrations. See generally, Bekkers & Smits 1999, § 6.2.1.
13
See Besen 1990,
9
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to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of, repair, use or operate
equipment or methods which comply with a standard without infringing
that IPR. For the avoidance of doubt in exceptional cases where a
standard can only be implemented by technical solutions, all of which are
infringements of IPRs, all such IPRs shall be considered essential.14
This definition, which was adopted verbatim in ETSI’s approved 1994 policy,15 and which
has persisted through the present,16 addresses several concepts. First, it introduces the
important distinction between “technical” and “commercial” essentiality, which is
discussed in Part B.2 below. Second, it establishes an absolute “not possible” threshold
for compliance. That is, an “essential” patent is one that it is simply “not possible” to
work around, as a technical matter, if a product is to be compliant with the standard. This
is far more definite, but also more stringent, than a standard such as “not feasible” or
“not practical”. The end result is that fewer patents will be deemed to be essential under
this strict standard (as with the technical essentiality standard discussed below). The
final part of the definition addresses the question of alternative implementations, which is
discussed in Part B.4 below.
Recall that during the early 1990s, ANSI’s definition of essentiality continued to be
relatively rudimentary: “required for compliance with the proposed [standard].” As noted
above, ANSI does not even introduce the word “essential” to its patent policy until 2006.
ETSI’s adoption of its much more detailed version of essentiality is likely due to the deep
involvement of the Commission, and more than a few corporate legal counsel, in its
formation, and the need, from the outset, to take into account competition law principles.
The mandatory character of ETSI’s telecommunications standards in Europe made it
particularly important to circumscribe carefully the scope of patents that would be
committed under ETSI’s policies. As the Commission wrote in 1992, “whenever public
authorities incorporate standards into legislation and thereby confer upon them a more
binding character than their normal voluntary status, they must satisfy themselves that
… the standards in question are available for use by all interested parties”. 17 The
importance of “essential” patents is thus elevated in the context of mandatory standards.
They act as gatekeepers not only to potentially lucrative commercial markets, as they do
in the context of voluntary consensus standards, but as gatekeepers to the only market
in the industry: one that is defined by government. For this reason, it is not surprising
that the Commission and ETSI devoted significant attention to the definition of
“essential” patents in ETSI’s earliest patent policies.
c)

IEEE

Unlike their European counterparts, U.S. antitrust enforcement agencies did not actively
intervene in the formation of most SDO patent policies. Thus, policy provisions
responsive to particular antitrust compliance issues did not enter into the policies of

14
15
16
17

ETSI 1993–Policy, App. A, Annex 1, § 6 (capitalization adjusted).
ETSI 1994–Policy, Annex, § 6.
ETSI 2016, Annex 6, §15(6), p.41.
European Comm. 1992, § 2.3.3.
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major U.S. SDOs until prompted by litigation18 or requests for review and clearance by
antitrust authorities.19
The Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (now known as IEEE) began as an
early technical trade association in 1884. Standards development at IEEE is conducted
through the IEEE Standards Association (IEEE-SA), an operating division that is
accredited by ANSI as a developer of American National Standards (see Chapter 9).
IEEE standards cover a broad of range of electrical and electronics applications
including electrical safety, equipment disposal, batteries, power distribution, computer
networking, and communications. Among the best-known IEEE standards are the 802.3
Ethernet standard series and the 802.11 Wi-Fi wireless networking standards.
Like ANSI, IEEE-SA historically permitted the inclusion of patented technologies in its
standards when justified by “technical reasons”. 20 In 1994, IEEE expanded its
description of which patents were included within the scope of its policy, stating that a
patented technology may be included in an IEEE standard only if, among other things,
“there are no alternative methods or devices that can be used to meet the requirements
of the standard without infringing on the patent”.21 This formulation was further refined in
1995 to permit the inclusion of patented technologies if there was “no equivalent,
noninfringing way of achieving the objectives of the standard.”22
Terminology relating to “essential” patents was not introduced to IEEE’s policies until
2005, when IEEE required each holder of a patent or patent application that “might be
essential to the implementation of” an IEEE standard to submit a letter committing to
license that patent on RF or RAND terms.23 But it was not until IEEE’s controversial
2006-07 policy amendments that an expansive definition of “Essential Patent Claim” was
introduced.24 The precise contours of IEEE’s recent definitions of essentiality, which
distinguishes between “technical” and “commercial” essentiality, are discussed in Parts
B.2.b and D.4 below.
2.

Essentiality and Patent Pools

As discussed in Chapter 8, a number of important standards in the electronics industry
(e.g., MPEG, CD, DVD) have been developed by participants in patent pools. Such
pools allow competitors to achieve efficiencies by aggregating their patents for purposes
of licensing and enforcement. As such, pools can achieve procompetitive benefits such
as lowering transaction costs and reducing royalty stacking by multiple independent
licensors. 25 But in order to achieve these efficiencies, many commentators and

18

For example, the Allied Tube and Hydrolevel U.S. Supreme Court cases prompted a number of SDOs to
adopt “due process” policies, and the highly publicized litigation involving Rambus prompted a number of changes and
clarifications to SDO patent policies. See ABA 2007, Preface.
19
In the United States, private parties may request a “business review letter” from the DOJ.
20
IEEE 1992, § 9.
21
IEEE 1994, § 6.3.1 (emphasis added).
22
IEEE 1995, § 5.
23
IEEE 2005, § 6.3.2.
24
IEEE 2007, § 6.1. IEEE’s 2007 policy was controversial due to its introduction of “ex ante” disclosure
procedures by which members could disclose maximum royalty rates prior to the adoption of a standard. See Chapter 15
and Contreras 2013a.
25
See Gilbert 2010a, 21; Gilbert 2010b, Part III.A.
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enforcement agencies concur that the patents included in a pool should generally be
complementary and not substitutes for one another.26
a)

Essentiality as Complementarity

Complementary technologies are those that are independently required in order to
achieve a stated purpose, such as compliance with a particular standard. When patents
covering complementary technologies are combined in a pool, the pool acts to reduce
transaction costs associated with licensing individual patents from diverse patent
holders. Such pools also enable the clearing of blocking positions and the elimination of
patent “thickets” that could reduce competition and innovation. But when a pool
aggregates patents covering technologies that may be substituted for one another, such
as patents covering different standards, innovation may be stifled. 27 For example, if
patents covering standards A and B are licensed separately, then the backers of
standard B will be motivated to improve standard B to compete for users with standard
A. If standard A achieves broad market acceptance in a typical “standards war”, then
there will be little or no market for patents covering standard B. As a result, the
developers of both standards A and B will strive to outperform the other in healthy
market competition. If, on the other hand, the patents covering standards A and B are
included in a pool, the developers of standard B will have little incentive to improve B in
relation to A, as there is not a competitive market for licensing B independently from A.
So long as users license the pooled patents, the backers of both standards will earn
revenue, and competition and innovation will suffer. Thus, as noted above, both
commentators and enforcement agencies have largely concluded that patent pools
should contain only patents that are essential to the standard that is the subject of the
pool.
This precept was critical to the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in its business review
of patent pools covering the MPEG-2 and DVD standards in the late 1990s and early
2000s. As Gilbert notes in Chapter 8, the DOJ, in deciding not to bring enforcement
actions against these pools, emphasized the importance of including only patents
essential to comply with the relevant standards.28 And, in the context of these pools, the
DOJ viewed “essential” as meaning that “there is no technical alternative” to any of the
patents included in the pool.29 Thus, the DOJ explains in its 1997 MPEG-2 letter:
The limitation of the Portfolio to technically essential patents, as opposed
to merely advantageous ones, helps ensure that the Portfolio patents are
not competitive with each other and that the Portfolio license does not, by
bundling in non-essential patents, foreclose the competitive
implementation options that the MPEG-2 standard has expressly left
open.30

26

See Shapiro 2001, 134; Gilbert 2010a, 4, Gilbert 2010b; DOJ 1997–MPEG Letter; DOJ 1998–DVD3C Letter;
DOJ 1999–DVD6C Letter.
27
Shapiro 2001, 134.
28
DOJ 1997–MPEG Letter; DOJ 1998–DVD3C Letter; DOJ 1999–DVD6C Letter. But as discussed in Chapter
8, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in Princo seemingly softened the requirement that only essential patents be
included in pools when failing to do so does not result in competitive harm. Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n (Fed. Cir.
2010, p.1338).
29
DOJ 1997–MPEG Letter, 9.
30
Id. at 10.
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The importance of excluding substitute technologies and patents from pooling structures
is best illustrated in the DOJ’s review of the 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP)
pooling arrangement. The 3GPP (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) was formed as an
over-arching
organizational
framework
for
five
competing
3G
wireless
telecommunications standards (CDMA-2000, W-CDMA, TD-CDMA, TDMA-EDGE and
DECT). Under this framework, patents essential to each standard would be separately
pooled and licensed. While 3GPP offered a number of common administrative services
to the individual pool operators, 31 both licensing and enforcement of the five pools’
patents was handled without coordination by 3GPP or among the five pools. The DOJ
approved of this approach, citing evidence that the five 3G standards were in
competition with each other and that the continuation of this competition was likely under
the proposed arrangement.32
Despite these statements from DOJ, at least one judicial decision in the U.S. suggests
that the exclusion of patents covering all substitute technologies from a patent pool is not
an absolute requirement for avoiding antitrust liability. In Princo v. ITC and related
cases,33 the Federal Circuit held that Philips did not commit patent misuse because one
patent included in a pool covering the CD-R/CD-RW standards was not technically
essential to the standard. The court reasoned that because the patent claimed
technology that Philips and Sony originally thought, in good faith, might be essential to
the standards, but which was ultimately not useful to either the CD standards or any
other commercial technology, the requisite elements of patent misuse were not present.
Though the court declined to rule on some antitrust aspects of the case, it also
acknowledged that a patent pool could provide procompetitive benefits even if it included
one or more non-essential patents.34
While most standards developed within SDOs are not the subject of patent pools,35 the
DOJ’s analysis of pooling arrangements has proven influential to SDO policy makers.
b)

Validating Essentiality – Costs and Benefits

Given the importance of determining the essentiality of patents to be included in a
standards-based patent pool, most such pools conduct a rigorous analysis to verify
whether or not patents are essential to the standard in question. In many cases, this
analysis is conducted by an independent expert. Such an independent review
mechanism was viewed with approval by the DOJ in its 1997 MPEG-2 business review
letter, in which it observed that “[t]he continuing role of an independent expert to assess
essentiality is an especially effective guarantor that the Portfolio patents are
complements, not substitutes.”36
This being said, independent essentiality experts do not come cheap. As noted by the
DOJ in its MPEG-2 letter, the designated expert “reviewed approximately 8,000 United
States patent abstracts and studied about 800 patents belonging to over 100 different

31

Among other things, 3GPP offered its members a common methodology for royalty calculation and a
standard set of licensing terms. DOJ 2002–3GPP , 10.
32
Id.
33
U.S. Philips Corp. v. ITC (Fed. Cir. 2005, p.1190–91); Princo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n (Fed. Cir. 2009,
p.1320).
34
For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 8.
35
Contreras 2013b.
36
DOJ 1997–MPEG Letter, 10.
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patentees or assignees.”37 The cost of patent essentiality review by independent experts
(typically specialized patent attorneys) has been estimated by Mattioli and Merges
(2016) at $7,500 per patent,38 and by Régibeau et al (2016) at 2000 Euro per patent if
conducted internally, and 9000 Euro per patent if conducted by an external firm. 39
Merges and Mattioli (2016) estimate that the initial essentiality analysis for the
establishment of the MPEG audio pool, which included approximately 700 patents, was
$5.25 million.40 And in a recent court filing, Ericsson estimated that an essentiality
assessment of its portfolio of 2,600 SEP families pertaining to ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 4G
standards would have cost approximately $26 million.41
Costs in this range are among the reasons that most technology standards are
developed in the SDO environment, in which patent essentiality determinations are
made by patent holders with no external verification, 42 rather than within pooling
structures.43
B.

The Many Meanings of Essentiality

SDO essentiality requirements are primarily creatures of policy language. As such,
different SDOs may define essentiality differently. 44 Bekkers and Updegrove (2012)
identify thirteen different features of SDO essentiality definitions that varied considerably
over the ten SSOs they studied.45 This section explores some of the variants that arise in
SDO definitions of essentiality and offers guidance regarding their usage and
interpretation.
1.

Claims versus Patents

Though much of the literature relating to standardization refers to “patents” that may be
essential to practice or implement a standard -- hence the ubiquitous term “standardessential patent” or SEP – it is more accurate in such discussions to refer to essential
patent claims rather than entire patents. 46 Patents often contain dozens of different
claims,47 some of which may cover technology included in a standard, and others of
which may not.
While this distinction may, at first, seem esoteric, it can have significant implications for
licensing. For example, suppose that a patent has 20 claims, one of which is essential to
implement a standard, but the other 19 of which are not. Under the rules of the relevant
SDO, what is the patent holder required to license to implementers of the standard?
37

Id. at 4–5.
Merges & Mattioli 2016, 25.
Régibeau et al. 2016, 50.
40
The MPEG audio pool administered by Via Licensing is distinct from the MPEG-2 pool administered by
MPEG-LA, which was the subject of the DOJ’s MPEG-2 business review letter.
41
Ericsson’s Redacted Trial Brief, TCL Communication Tech. Holdings, Ltd. v. Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson
(C.D. Cal. 2017).
42
See Part C.1 below.
43
Contreras 2013b.
44 The same holds true for patent pools. See DOJ-FTC 2007, 74-75 (noting that each patent pool that sought a
buseinss review letter from the DOJ used a slightly different definition of essentiality).
45
Some of these variations involved the degree to which copyrights and other intellectual property, in addition to
patents, could be considered essential to a particular standard.
46
See ABA 2007, 10 (discouraging use of the term “essential patent” in lieu of “essential claim”).
47
There is no limit to the number of claims that may be included in a U.S. patent. At least three U.S. patents
have been issued with more than 800 claims (6,684,189, 5,095,054, 7,096,160), and one infamous application filed in
2003 and still pending as of this writing has more than 8,000 claims (US20030173072A1).
38
39
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Only the single claim that is essential to the standard, or all 20 claims of the patent,
including those that are non-essential? And if the latter, must the 19 non-essential
claims also be licensed on terms that are FRAND or even royalty-free?
This question was raised in the Innovatio case, in which the defendant implementers
argued that Innovatio’s obligation to license an essential claim of a patent extended to
the other claims. The court rejected this argument, relying on both the express language
of IEEE’s policy, as well as general principles of patent law.
[T]he Defendants contend that Innovatio is obligated to license entire
patents on RAND terms, rather than merely individual patent claims.
Accordingly, the Defendants assert that the RAND commitment applies to
an entire patent if any claim in the patent is standard-essential. That
argument gains some support from the Letters of Assurance from
Innovatio’s predecessors, some of which promise to license “patents”.
The problem, however, is that the IEEE Bylaws, which the parties have
agreed define the terms of Innovatio’s RAND commitment, explicitly
provide that “[a]n Essential Patent Claim does not include . . . any claim
other than that set forth above even if contained in the same patent as
the Essential Patent Claim.” The IEEE Bylaws therefore plainly
contemplate that some claims, but not others, in a particular patent may
be standard-essential.
More generally, patent law looks to individual claims to define the scope
of a patent right. As the Federal Circuit has explained, “[a] patent is
infringed if any claim is infringed . . . for each claim is a separate
statement of the patented invention.” Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations,
Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Given that basic attribute of
patent law, the promise to license any standard-essential patent must be
interpreted as a promise to license only the standard-essential claims, the
basic unit for evaluation of any patented invention. The court will therefore
evaluate each patent claim separately for standard-essentiality.48
The court’s reasoning in Innovatio is sensible, though to the extent that it relies on the
specific language of the IEEE policy, its applicability to SDOs with different policy
language is limited. Even so, it would appear unreasonable to argue that claims of a
patent that are non-essential to a standard should be licensed simply because the patent
contains other claims that are essential, even when an SDO’s policy speaks only to
patents and not to patent claims.
2.

Commercial versus Technical Essentiality
a)

A Matter of Degree?

One major divide among SDO patent policies is whether they define an “essential”
patent claim as covering a technology that must, as a technical or engineering matter, be
included in a product implementing a standard (technical essentiality) or whether that
patented technology, though not strictly required as a technical matter, is the only
commercially feasible way that the standard can be implemented (i.e., considering
48

In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litig. (N.D. Ill. 2013, 936–37) (some internal citations omitted).
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factors such as manufacturing cost, efficiency, reliability, manufacturability, etc.)
(commercial essentiality).49
For example, 50 suppose that a municipal electrical standard specifies a range of
tolerances (pressure, temperature, corrosion resistance, puncture resistance, etc.) for
wiring conduits. Such conduits are typically made from aluminum, though other materials
could also be used to make such conduits. Thus, a patent covering the use of aluminum
conduits for wiring would not be technically essential to the standard, as one could use
various other materials. But suppose that the only alternative material that met the other
tolerance requirements of the specification were gold. Aluminum conduit costs an
average of $0.15 per meter, while gold conduit, if such a thing were ever made, would
cost $2,000.00 per meter. Under this scenario, a patent covering aluminum conduit
might no longer be considered technically essential to the standard, as gold, technically
speaking, could also be used to make compliant conduits. Nevertheless, given these
two alternatives, there is no commercially feasible alternative to aluminum. Thus, when
the only technical substitute for aluminum conduit is significantly more costly, a patent
covering the use of aluminum conduit would likely be commercially essential to the
standard.
But what if, in addition to aluminum and gold, polyvinyl chloride (PVC) is also a suitable
material for conduit which meets all the requirements of the specification. PVC costs
$0.45 per meter: three times more than aluminum, but far less than gold. Is PVC, at
three times the cost of aluminum, a commercially feasible substitute for aluminum? If
so, is an aluminum conduit patent still commercially essential to the implementation of
the conduit standard? What if the cost of PVC conduit dropped to $0.25 per meter? Or
to $0.16? Just how different must the qualities and pricing of a substitute technology
(PVC) be before another technology (aluminum) is no longer considered commercially
essential to the standard?
This question of degree must be factored into the analysis by SDOs deciding how to
define essentiality. While technical essentiality may seem rather unforgiving and unfairly
exclude some patents from the reach of the SDO’s policy (e.g., a patent on aluminum
conduit, when gold exists as a technically-, though not commercially-feasible,
alternative), the virtually limitless gradations of pricing, quality and availability that factor
into commercial manufacturing decisions could make determinations as to commercial
essentiality hopelessly fraught. The next section discusses the design choices that
several SDOs have made as between commercial and technical essentiality.
b)

SDO Policies: Commercial versus Technical Essentiality

SDO patent policies are divided as to whether they consider the essentiality of a patent
to a standard to mean technical or commercial essentiality. In a 2012 survey conducted
by Bekkers and Updegrove, only two of ten SDO policies examined used a definition of
“commercial” rather than “technical” essentiality, though only one (ETSI, discussed
below) expressly rules out commercial factors in determining essentiality.51

49

ABA 2007; Bekkers & Updegrove 2012; Contreras 2013b; Kesan & Hayes 2014.
This example is inspired by the dispute over electrical wiring conduit made famous by the Supreme Court’s
Allied Tube (U.S. 1988) decision. Other illustrative examples of essentiality in standard-setting can be found in ABA 2007,
18–19 (alarm functionality) and Kesan & Hayes 2014, 243–44 (slide-to-unlock).
51
Bekkers & Updegrove 2012, 35 Table 4.
50
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In considering the effect of these policy variations, as a general rule more patents will be
considered essential to a standard (and hence disclosed or licensed) under a
commercial essentiality approach than under a technical essentiality approach.52 Thus,
in the conduit example above, a commercial essentiality approach results in an
aluminum conduit patent being considered essential (and disclosed/licensed) even
though gold may also be used to make conduit (as gold conduit is commercially
impractical due to its relative cost), whereas a technical essentiality approach results in
the aluminum conduit patent not being essential, as gold could technically act as a
substitute (albeit an expensive one).
As discussed in Part A.1.c above, since its first interim patent policy was approved in
1993, ETSI has adhered to a technical essentiality approach. In each of its policies ETSI
has stipulated that in order for a patent to be deemed essential to an ETSI standard, it
must not be “possible” to make, use or sell a standardized product without infringing the
patent. This analysis is conducted solely in terms of technical possibility, “taking into
account normal technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the time
of standardization”.53 Conversely, ETSI’s policy makes it clear that “commercial grounds”
(i.e., the commercial impracticality of a technical substitute) are not valid bases for
disregarding theoretically feasible technical substitutes for the patented technology. This
construction of essentiality is designed to limit the number of patents covered by ETSI’s
patent disclosure and licensing requirements, possibly due to ETSI’s establishment as
the developer of mandatory, pan-European telecommunications standards which would
be adopted by every national network operator and its respective equipment suppliers.54
IEEE, on the other hand, has since it first introduced a definition of essentiality to its
patent policy in 2007, used a commercial essentiality approach. IEEE’s definition of
“Essential Patent Claim” includes any patent claim, the practice of which is necessary to
implement an IEEE standard, but only if at the time of the standard’s approval “there was
no commercially and technically feasible non-infringing alternative”.55 The meaning of
IEEE’s commercial essentiality definition was discussed at length by the court in
Innovatio, in which the essentiality of 168 different patent claims to IEEE’s 802.11
standards was challenged. The court confirmed the interpretation of IEEE’s commercial
essentiality requirement, reasoning that “even if some prohibitively expensive alternative
existed when the standard was approved, a claim may still be [essential], because no
alternative was ‘commercially’ feasible.”56
Policies of large, sophisticated SDOs such as ETSI, ANSI and IEEE specify, with varying
degrees of clarity, whether essentiality should be taken to mean technical or commercial
essentiality. However, most SDOs are not so explicit. In the Bekkers and Updegrove
study mentioned above, seven of ten major SDOs did not explicitly state whether
“essential” meant technical or commercial essentiality, leaving the researchers to
interpret these polices based on other textual clues.57 In the absence of contrary policy
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language, should technical essentiality generally be assumed?58 It is not so clear that
this approach is desirable, particularly given the absurd scenarios (such as the gold
conduit example) that can arise when a strict technical essentiality standard is applied.
Perhaps a more reasonable approach, at least when such terms must be interpreted in
litigation, is to look to the understandings and expectations of the individual participants
in the SDO. This approach, which has been used successfully to interpret the meaning
of other provisions of ambiguous SDO patent policies,59 can establish how such policy
terms are interpreted and utilized by participants on an operational basis, perhaps the
most important functions of an SDO’s policies.
c)

Patent Pools, Antitrust and Commercial Essentiality

As noted in Part A.2 above, SDO essentiality requirements are primarily creatures of
SDO policy language. This predominantly textual approach differs from that used with
respect to patent pools, in which the essentiality requirement for pooled patents
addresses antitrust compliance considerations. Nevertheless, given the close
relationship between standards developed by members of patent pools and those
developed within SDOs, it is both desirable and unavoidable that judicial and agency
interpretations rendered with respect to essentiality of pooled patents should inform the
interpretation of essentiality within SDO policies. As discussed below, the DOJ, in
reviewing proposed patent pools for potential antitrust enforcement, has approved
pooling arrangements that use both technical and commercial essentiality approaches.60
When assessing the potential competitive benefits and harms of patent pools covering
technical standards, the DOJ has considered whether a pool contains only patents that
are complementary to one another (generally procompetitive), or whether substitute
technologies are encompassed within the pool (often anticompetitive).61 As explained by
the DOJ and FTC, “pools consisting only of complementary patents are least likely to
prove anticompetitive.”62 By the same token, the DOJ has stated that inclusion in a pool
of substitute patents could devolve into nothing more than a “price-fixing mechanism.”63
This notion of complementarity, or lack of substitutability, is, in the context of pool
analysis, generally equated with essentiality. That is, an essential patent is one that has
no substitutes, however those may be defined.
In its 1997 MPEG-2 business review letter, the DOJ reviewed a proposed pool in which
the members defined essentiality in technical terms, defining it as the absence of
“technical alternative[s]” to any of the patents included in the pool.64 Likewise, in its 2002
3GPP business review letter, the DOJ reviewed a set of proposed pools in which
included patents were required to be “technically essential”.65 In both of these letters,
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the DOJ approved of the mechanisms for including patents in the proposed pools on the
basis of their technical essentiality.
In other cases, however, the DOJ was asked to review proposed patent pools in which
elements of commercial essentiality were introduced. Thus, in its 1999 DVD-6C letter,
the agency approved a pool in which patents were deemed to be essential to the DVD
standard if they were “necessarily infringed” by implementing the standard in a product
or if there was “no realistic alternative” to the use of the patented technology in
implementing the standard.66 While language requiring that a patent “necessarily” be
infringed in order to be considered essential implies technical essentiality, the language
that speaks to the absence of realistic alternatives to the patented technology suggests
commercial essentiality. That is, even though a patented technology might in theory be
replaced by another technology that complies with the standard, the patented technology
will be considered essential if it has no “realistic” alternatives. As represented by the
applicant, the independent expert engaged to assess the essentiality of patents being
considered for inclusion in the pool interpreted “realistic” to mean “economically feasible”
and excluded from the pool patents as to which economically feasible alternatives
existed.67 The DOJ accepted this representation but warned that if the expert, over time,
interpreted “realistic” more broadly to encompass patents as to which economically
feasible alternatives exist, serious questions would arise regarding the pool’s effect on
competition.
Nine years later, in its 2008 RFID business review letter, the DOJ considered a pool that
explicitly contemplated commercial considerations in its essentiality criteria. In that pool,
a patent was considered essential if it was “necessarily infringed” by a product
implementing the standard (technically essential), or if “a license [was] necessary as a
practical matter because there are no economically viable substitutes to [m]ake, use or
sell" products complying with the standard. 68 In assessing the economic viability of
substitutes, factors such as “production or design costs, consumer preferences, or other
reasons” could be considered.69 Again, the DOJ approved of this approach, provided
that it is applied “scrupulously and independently”.70
3.

Essentiality of Mandatory, Optional and Alternative Technologies

Many standards contain portions that are mandatory for compliance, as well as portions
that are optional. In general, optional portions of standards may either be truly optional
(included or omitted without consequence to compliance) or alternative (one of two or
more approaches must be selected in order to comply with the standard).71 In addition, a
standard may describe “enabling technologies” which may be necessary to comply with
the standard, but which are not part of the standard itself.72 Though the precise definition
of each of these terms will be dependent on the language of the relevant SDO policy, the
court in Innovatio recognized as a rule of thumb that mandatory portions of a standard
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are often designated by the term “shall”, whereas optional portions are often designated
by the terms “may” or “should”.73
To illustrate the use of these terms, in the wiring conduit example used above, the
standard may specify “a cylindrical wiring conduit 5 cm in diameter and able to withstand
internal pressure of 100 psi”. The specified diameter and pressure tolerances are
mandatory components of the standard. The standard may go on to state that “such
conduit may be comprised of aluminum or PVC material”. Here, aluminum and PVC are
alternatives within the standard: neither one is strictly required, but one of the two
materials, and no other, must be chosen. On the other hand, the phrase “such conduit
may be marked with a water-resistant coating of any color” is truly optional. And, finally,
a requirement that “the conduit must be suitable for testing by an ASME-certified
leakage detection system” mentions a piece of external equipment (the detection
system) which is not specified by the standard, but which is necessary for use of the
standardized conduit. The ASME-certified detection system is an enabling technology.
SDO policies will often specify whether, in order to be “essential” a patent claim must be
necessary (technically or commercially) to implement mandatory portions of a standard,
or whether patent claims will also be deemed essential if they cover alternative or
optional portions. 74 In general, patents covering enabling technologies are not
considered essential to a standard referencing such enabling technology.
4.

Timing and Essentiality

Another sometimes-overlooked consideration relating to whether a particular patent
claim may be essential to a standard is the point in time at which this determination is
made. As discussed in Chapter 14, the timing of this determination often triggers a
patent-holder’s obligation to disclose patents to an SDO and its participants, and will
decide whether or not a patent must be licensed on terms specified by the SDO (i.e.,
FRAND or royalty-free). Some SDOs specify that the essentiality determination should
be made when a standard is approved or published, or earlier, such as when a technical
contribution is submitted for consideration as part of a standard.75
Timing considerations are also important in order to determine whether the patent holder
has complied with its disclosure and licensing obligations. That is, whether the patent
holder accurately disclosed its relevant SEPs to the SDO when required by the SDO’s
policy, or whether it withheld information about SEPs that it should have disclosed. Key
to this determination is whether particular patents are, indeed, SEPs and thus “essential”
to the relevant standard. In making this determination years after a disclosure allegedly
should have been made, it is important to avoid hindsight bias and to assess the patent
holder’s compliance based solely on information and technical capabilities available at
the time that the essentiality determination was made. This issue is discussed by the
court in Innovatio in interpreting the IEEE policy:
even if one could hypothesize an alternative way to implement the
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standard, a claim is still standard-essential if that hypothetical
implementation was not technically feasible when the standard was
approved … If later technological development creates another, noninfringing means to comply with the standard, a patent claim is still
standard-essential.76
Thus, “later technological development” is not relevant to the determination of
essentiality at the time specified by the SDO policy (in the case of IEEE, the time that the
proposed standard was approved).
Some policies do not expressly specify a time at which essentiality must be determined,
but do require that patent disclosures or licensing offers be made a specific time (e.g., as
soon as practical during standardization, prior to balloting of a technical proposal, etc.)
In these situations, the essentiality determination should be interpreted to be made at
the time the specified action is required.
C.

Essentiality and Over-Declaration

Whatever definition of essentiality is adopted by an SDO, the actual determination
whether a particular patent is essential to a standard is initially left to the patent holder.77
Due to resource and staff constraints, SDOs, unlike patent pools (discussed above)
rarely review or validate their participants’ determinations of essentiality. In fact, some
SDOs expressly prohibit internal working groups from assessing the applicability of
particular patents to their technical output, and stipulate that the representations of the
disclosing patent holder should be taken at face value.78 Thus, whether a patent holder
is obliged under an SDO policy to disclose its essential patents to the SDO or to license
its essential patents to others, the identification of which of patents are, indeed,
essential, is unilaterally made by the patent holder, subject only to a contravening
determination in litigation. This situation has led to what many commentators have
criticized as widespread “over-disclosure” or “over-declaration” of patents claimed to be
essential to standards.79
1.

Factors Leading to Over-Declaration

Given that patent holders often compute royalties based, at least in part, on the number
of patents being licensed, there is a clear commercial incentive for patent holders to
identify as many patents as possible as “essential” to a given standard. But opportunistic
royalty maximization is not necessarily the only, or even the primary, cause of overdeclaration of patents to an SDO. Rather there are several external and internal factors
that could drive even “honest” patent holders to declare the essentiality of patents that
may eventually be found not to be essential to particular standards.
First, and most importantly, is the large disparity between penalties for under-declaring
versus over-declaring patents essential to a standard. As seen in cases such as Wang
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v. Diebold, In re. Dell, Broadcom v. Qualcomm and In re. Rambus, Inc., patent holders
face serious liability for violating an SDO’s requirement that essential patents be
disclosed, including claims of anticompetitive behavior, deceptive conduct and fraud.80
As exemplified by Dell, the penalties for such failures to disclose could result in the
unenforceability of undisclosed patents, even if such patents are essential to the relevant
standard.81 Conversely, there appear to be few legal or regulatory penalties associated
with declaring too many patents as essential to a standard.
In other words, patent holders may disclose to an SDO patents that are not actually
essential, or even relevant, to a standard with few legal or practical consequences.82
Accordingly, patent holders involved in standards development have a strong incentive
to disclose to an SDO, and make FRAND commitments with respect to, all patents that
have even a remote possibility of being relevant to a standard.
This natural incentive to seek to avoid liability for under-disclosure is augmented by
genuine uncertainty regarding the scope of some patent claims, which, depending on
how broadly they are drafted and interpreted, may or may not cover particular aspects of
a standard. Moreover, disclosure of essential patents is often required before a
standard is approved and finalized by an SDO. As a result, the claims of patents that
are declared essential to a draft standard may or may not be essential to the version of
the standard that is ultimately approved, or to its subsequent versions. Finally, to the
extent that SDOs require the disclosure of patent applications in addition to issued
patents, the scope of the issued patent’s claims may not even be known at the time a
patent is declared as essential to a standard.83
Over-declaration is not inevitable, and it is certainly possible that some patent holders
may wish to limit the number of patents that they declare to be essential to a standard in
order to insulate such patents from FRAND licensing obligations (i.e., to license those
non-essential patents at rates that are higher than FRAND, or not to license them at
all).84 This tactic is even more likely when an SDO has adopted a policy of royalty-free
licensing. For example, in Lotes v. Hon Hai,85 it was alleged that Chinese contract
manufacturer Foxconn violated a royalty-free licensing commitment made with respect to
patents covering the USB 3.0 standard, when it claimed that such patents were not
essential to the standard. In most cases, however, given the relatively unbounded
nature of FRAND licensing rates and the severe penalties for failing to disclose
standards-essential patents, it seems unlikely that patent holders would intentionally
withhold patents of potential relevance to a standard in order to license them on terms
that are explicitly not FRAND.
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2.

Quantifying Over-Declaration

There is evidence that these incentives to over-declare patents to SDOs have, indeed,
resulted in significant over-declaration. For example, in an often-cited series of studies
by Fairfield Research, only 28%, 29% and 50% of patent families declared “essential” to
ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 4G wireless telecommunications standards, respectively, were
actually essential to implementation of those standards. 86 Cyber Creative (2013)
independently evaluated a sample of 2,129 SEPs declared essential to the LTE standard
(representing 36% of the 5,919 total declared SEPs). It found that 56% of the sampled
SEPs were “truly” essential to the standard, while 29% were partially essential and 15%
were not essential at all. The investigators then calculated the ratio of essential to nonessential declared SEPs for each major contributor to the standard, finding that several
firms including Apple, Alcatel-Lucent, Freescale and Nortel had essentiality ratios of 40%
or less, while ZTE, CATT, NTT DoCoMo and InnovativeSonic had ratios above 80%.
The average essentiality ratio observed was 56.6%, or 53.8% when only issued patents
were considered. Interviews conducted by Blind et al. (2011) and Régibeau et al. (2016)
also point to widespread over-declaration of patents at SDOs and identify overdeclaration as a significant area of concern for stakeholders in standardization.
While the factors leading to over-declaration can be understood, it must also be
recognized that over-declaration distorts the overall picture of patent coverage of
particular standards. Thus, a standard covered by 1,000 patents may look very different,
from a royalty standpoint, than a standard covered by 250 patents. Moreover, the actual
technical value contributed by those patent holders who have over-declared most
aggressively may be greatly overstated and reduced or eliminated entirely if essentiality
were assessed more stringently.
Typically, the fact that over-declaration has occurred would not become apparent until a
patent holder sought to enforce its patents against a standard implementer, at which
point a court would decide whether those patents were infringed and/or invalid. But prior
to market adoption of a standard, a vendor is confronted with the prospect of engaging in
multiple time-consuming and costly negotiations to license patents that may not, in the
end, actually be essential to a standard (even if the standard is ultimately successful,
which is also uncertain). It may thus be rational for a vendor to adopt a “wait and see”
approach and engage in licensing negotiations only with patent holders that approach it
with credibly essential patents. In most cases, such approaches will occur only after the
market adoption of a standard and the release of a vendor product that implements the
standard.
3.

Proposals to Address Over-Declaration

To begin to address over-declaration, Régibeau et al. (2016) have proposed a number
of possible approaches, including increasing the cost of declaring SEPs, limiting the
number of patents that any SSO participant may declare as essential, and instituting
random essentiality testing of patents declared as essential.87
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As discussed above, patent pools often allow pool members to challenge the essentiality
of patents contributed to the pool by other members. As a general rule, however, the
initial essentiality determinations undertaken by pools are too costly to be practical within
the context of voluntary consensus standard setting. To obtain some of the advantages
of pooling, Contreras (2013b) has proposed an aggregate royalty system for SEPs
termed a “pseudo-pool”. Under this system, an aggregate royalty for all SEPs applicable
to a particular standard would be negotiated by SDO participants. The proceeds from
licensing SEPs covering the standard would be divided among SEP holders, who would
be given the opportunity to challenge each others’ essentiality determinations, with
penalties assessed against over-declaration.
Another innovative approach was taken by IPXI, an electronic exchange that sought to
enable market-based trading of unitized license rights under a portfolio of 129 patents
covering the 802.11n standard.88 IPXI engaged an independent expert to verify the
essentiality of all patents that were aggregated in its unitized license package. Despite
having several innovative features, the IPXI exchange was not commercially successful
and ceased operations in 2015.
D.

Challenges to Essentiality

Challenges to claims of essentiality can be raised in patent litigation under several
circumstances. First, if the asserted patents were not declared as essential to a standard
developed within an SDO that imposes disclosure or licensing commitments on its
participants (and their transferees), then an accused infringer may argue that the patents
are essential to such a standard and that as a result (a) the patent holder violated its
obligation to disclose the patents to the SDO and other participants during the
standardization process, or (b) the patents should be subject to the SDO’s royalty-free or
FRAND licensing commitments. Conversely, an accused infringer may argue that
asserted patents are not essential to a standard, thus diminishing their value and/or
making the patent holder’s case for proving infringement more difficult. Such disputes
may also arise before patents are asserted, when a patent holder seeks to license its
SEPs to the manufacturer of a standardized product and the manufacturer claims that
some or all of the proffered patents are not essential to practice the standard. The
outcome of such a dispute may both influence the magnitude of the royalty paid by the
manufacturer, and also determine whether or not the patent holder complied with its
obligations, for example, under negotiation procedures established under Huawei v. ZTE
in Europe89 or the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.90 As such, disputes regarding the
essentiality of patents to industry standards have become increasingly common.91
1.

Competition Law Enforcement – Sun/ETSI (EC)

One avenue available to parties disputing the essentiality of declared SEPs is lodging a
complaint with a relevant competition or antitrust law agency. Such an action was taken
by a small firm called MicroElectronica in response to a patent declaration made by Sun
Microsystems to ETSI with respect to the GSM standard.92 In 2000, MicroElectronica
filed a complaint with the European Commission alleging several violations by Sun of
88
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Article 81 of the TFEU. 93 Among these were allegations that Sun filed its patent
declaration too late (long after standardization work had been completed) and that Sun
falsely declared a non-essential patent to be essential to GSM. According to
MicroElectronica, such false declarations of essentiality could have the effect of
improperly influencing technology choices during standards development (i.e., driving
standards toward other patented positions) and chilling downstream innovation (if
product developers fear high royalty burdens from standardized technologies). In
response to MicroElectronica’s claim and the Commission’s subsequent investigation,
ETSI removed Sun’s allegedly false declaration from its database and committed to
clarify its patent policy.94 Sun subsequently settled with MicroElectronica.95
2.

Judicial Declaration of Non-Essentiality - Nokia v. InterDigital (UK)

In two separate actions in the English courts, Nokia pre-emptively sought a novel judicial
declaration that certain of InterDigital’s declared SEPs were not essential to ETSI
standards (termed a “non-essentiality declaration”).96 The first action was brought in
2004 in relation to three patents declared essential to ETSI’s 2G GSM standard,97 the
second was brought in 2006 in relation to 31 patents declared essential to ETSI’s 3G
UMTS standard.98 In both cases, the UK High Court (Patents) determined that issuing
such a “negative declaration” was within the court’s power and discretion.
InterDigital objected to the notion of a declaration of non-essentiality, arguing that such a
judicial declaration would have no value, given that an implementer could be found to
infringe a patent whether or not it was essential to a standard or merely covered a
particular implementation of the standard. The court rejected this argument, noting that
the status of a patent as a SEP carries potentially significant value in licensing
negotiations.99
The 2G case was settled in 2008 prior to the issuance of the court’s decision. In the 3G
case, however, the Patent Court ruled on the requested negative declaration in late
2007. Of the 31 patents initially asserted by InterDigital, only four remained in
contention at the time of trial. Of these four, the court found only one that it deemed
essential to the relevant standard. The court’s analysis was based on a claim-by-claim
analysis of the asserted patents against the elements of the standard. The case settled
in 2008 prior to adjudication of infringement or invalidity. Nevertheless, these cases are
important for establishing the availability of a judicial non-essentiality declaration in the
UK courts, and may be informative for courts in other jurisdictions.
3.

Essentiality Asserted by Patentee – Unwired Planet v. Huawei (UK)

Unwired Planet, a patent assertion entity, acquired a portfolio of more than 2,800 patents
from Ericsson in 2013. In 2014, it asserted six of these patents in the UK against a group
of defendants including Huawei, Samsung and Google.100 Unwired Planet claimed that
five of the six patents were essential to a portion of ETSI’s 4G LTE standard. Mister
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Justice Birss of the UK High Court (Patent) divided the trial into five segments, ruling in
late 2015 on the first of these, which concerned a single UK patent. 101 The court’s
decision regarding essentiality of the asserted patent hinged on the question of claim
construction. In essence the parties acknowledged that if the plaintiff’s construction were
accepted, then the patent would be essential to the standard.102 After a detailed claim
construction exercise, Birss, J. agreed with Unwired Planet’s construction and concluded
that the patent was essential to the standard.103
4.

Essentiality of Multiple Patents - In re. Innovatio (U.S.)

Perhaps the most extensive judicial analysis of patent essentiality occurred in Innovatio
(2013), in which the essentiality of 168 patent claims to the IEEE’s 802.11 standard was
disputed.104 In the case, Innovatio, the patent holder, asserted 441 claims of 23 patents
against a group of wireless router users and manufacturers. In disputing the total
damages potentially available to the patent holder, the defendants argued that all claims
of the asserted patents were “essential” to the 802.11 standard and thereby subject to
IEEE’s RAND limitation on royalties. The patent holder contested the essentiality of 168
claims of the asserted patents, presumably so that it could seek royalties in excess of
RAND rates with respect to those non-essential claims.
The court first established that the defendants bore the burden of proving the essentiality
of asserted patent claims to the standard, as the argument as to RAND limitations on
available royalties was akin to an affirmative defense.105 The court next interpreted the
essentiality definitions set forth in the 2007 version of IEEE’s patent policy (discussed at
Part B.2 above). Among the court’s key determinations regarding the policy was that a
patent claim will be considered essential if "the only commercially and technically
feasible way" to implement the standard is to infringe the patent and the claim "includes,
at least in part, technology that is explicitly required by or expressly set forth in the
standard."106 The court rejected Innovatio’s argument that claims should not be deemed
essential simply because they recite elements, such as enabling technologies, that are
not strictly required for compliance with the standard.107
Having established the basis for assessing essentiality under IEEE’s policy, the court
undertook a detailed category-by-category analysis to determine whether individual
patent claims covered technology that was necessary to comply with the standard.108 To
break down this prodigious task, the parties classified the technology into fifteen
separate categories and assessed the patent claims addressing each of these
categories separately. After completing this analysis, the court found that all 168
disputed patent claims were essential to the 802.11 standard and thus subject to IEEE’s
RAND licensing requirements.
Though the Innovatio decision is based on an interpretation a now-superseded version
of one SDO’s patent policy, it offers a number of generalizable principles relating to the
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interpretation of SDO essentiality requirements, as well as a useful roadmap for the
analysis of essentiality disputes in the future.
5.

Essentiality in Top-Down Royalty Allocations - TCL v Ericsson (U.S.)

In a case that is currently pending in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California, Chinese smartphone manufacturer TCL has alleged that Ericsson breached
its FRAND commitments by refusing to grant TCL a license to Ericsson’s patents
essential to ETSI’s 2G, 3G and 4G standards.109 TCL asserts that it should be entitled to
a license for these SEPs bearing a royalty based on Ericsson’s overall share of the
SEPs covering these standards. This is a so-called “top-down” royalty approach, in
which the aggregate royalty attributable to a standard is based on the value of the
standard to the end product in which it is implemented (here, a smartphone), and the
portion of that aggregate royalty allocable to the SEP holder is determined based on its
share of the SEPs covering that standard.110 TCL’s expert testified that for 2G/3G, the
maximum aggregate royalty burden should not exceed 5% of the end product price,
while for 4G it should not exceed 6-8%.111 Both figures were purportedly derived from
public statements made by Ericsson. TCL’s experts then determined that Ericsson’s
share of all SEPs was 8% for 2G, 3.7% for 3G and 4.7% for 4G.112 On this basis, TCL’s
experts calculate a proposed FRAND royalty rate for the requested SEP license. Not
surprisingly, Ericsson contests both TCL’s methodology and results.113
This case is in its early stages. However, whatever the eventual outcome, it highlights
the potential importance of essentiality determinations not on a patent-by-patent basis,
but on an aggregate basis in support of top-down royalty calculation methodologies. A
form of top-down approach was used by the U.S. district court in Innovatio,114 as well as
the Japanese IP Court in Samsung v. Apple Japan. 115 To the extent that top-down
approaches gain in popularity, as some commentators have suggested,116 then reliable,
efficient, and cost-effective methodologies for assessing the essentiality of large
numbers of declared SEPs will need to be developed.
Conclusion
As creatures of policy language, different SDO definitions of essentiality must be given
interpretive deference. Nevertheless, as scholarship and case law in this area expands,
a number of common themes emerge in the interpretation of essentiality requirements.
One such theme is the economic equation of essentiality with non-substitutability that
has arisen in the context of patent pools. Another is the blurred divide between
commercial and technical essentiality. A third is the practical necessity of assessing
essentiality when hundreds of potentially essential patent claims are at issue. These
issues, coupled with the recognized phenomenon of over-declaration, suggests that
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more efficient, rapid and cost-effective methods for assessing essentiality may be called
for. Moreover, when strict legal interpretation of policy language is likely to yield absurd
results -- as when a patent is deemed non-essential because a theoretically equivalent,
but impractically costly, alternative exists -- the norms and expectations of the relevant
SDO participants should be taken into account.
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